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Abstract 
 
In 2008–09 the world experienced the most severe financial and economic crisis since the 
Great Depression. The global financial crisis is attributed to a variety of factors, such as 
developments in the subprime mortgage sector, excessive leverage, lax financial regulation 
and supervision, and global macroeconomic imbalances. At a fundamental level, however, 
the crisis also reflects the effects of a long period of excessively loose monetary policy in the 
major advanced economies during the early part of this past decade. The global financial 
crisis has led to a new wave of thinking on all issues related to both monetary policy and 
financial regulation. The practice of both monetary policy and financial regulation had tended 
to become too formula bound and hence predictable. While these new principles are being 
debated, it is important to realize that in the face of unexpected developments that always 
arise in the financial sector, there is an important role for the exercise of judgment by both 
monetary authorities and financial regulators. Whereas considerable progress has been 
achieved on the principles governing this regulatory overhaul, very significant challenges 
remain on the implementation issues that will arise as a new regime takes hold globally. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2008–09 the world experienced the most severe financial and economic crisis since the 
Great Depression. Although the crisis originated in the subprime mortgage market in the 
United States (US), it then spread to Europe and later to the rest of the world. The speed of 
the contagion that spread across the world was perhaps unprecedented. What started off as 
a relatively limited crisis in the US  housing mortgage sector turned successively into a 
widespread banking crisis in the US  and Europe, the breakdown of both domestic and 
international financial markets, and then later into a full-blown global economic crisis. 
Interestingly, however, although the emerging market economies in Asia and Latin America 
also suffered severe economic impacts from the crisis,  their financial sectors exhibited 
relative stability. No important financial institutions in these economies were affected in any 
significant fashion. So it really should be dubbed as the North Atlantic financial crisis rather 
than as a global financial crisis. 
The severity of the crisis can be gauged from a number of metrics. From an average annual 
growth rate of 4.1% between 2001 and 2008, world GDP growth fell to -0.8% in 2009 and is 
projected by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to recover to 3.9% in 2010.
1 That the 
world was taken by surprise by the developments in 2008 and 2009 is shown by the fact that 
as late as July 2008, the IMF expected world gross domestic product (GDP) to grow by 3.9% 
in 2009.
2 The reversal in expectations was so sudden that exactly a year later the forecast 
had been reversed to -1.4% for 2009.
3 Similarly, the growth forecast for 2010 was as low as 
1.9%  in April 2009;  the speed of the recovery now taking place in 2010 was also 
unexpected.
4
Optimism regarding the world economy had continued until mid-2008. In fact, global market 
capitalization fell by 53% between the end of October 2007 and the end of March 2009, and 
losses on US-originated credit assets were estimated by the IMF in April 2009 to amount to 
$2.7 trillion.  As economies have  contracted,  unemployment has increased to levels in 
excess of 10% in North America and Europe, and there is as yet little sign of recovery in 
employment. The decline in property prices has led to a severe reduction in household 
wealth. Global credit write-downs were estimated by the IMF at $2.8 trillion in the October 
2009 Global Financial Stability Report.
 
5
Almost all governments and central banks of the world were busy during 2008 and 2009 in 
an effort to contain the effects of the crisis through both fiscal and monetary policy 
measures, respectively. The fiscal effort, which has been largely successful at containing the 
economic effects of the crisis, has been massive. Fiscal expansion of the Group of Twenty 
(G20) countries, relative to their 2007 levels, is approximately 6% of their GDP in both 2009 
and 2010; US fiscal expansion is much higher, at just under 10% of its GDP. In containing 
the emerging North Atlantic financial crash in 2008–09,  the  total support given to the 
financial sector in advanced economies was  approximately  $7  trillion, including capital 
injections into financial institutions by governments, purchase of assets by treasuries, central 
bank liquidity injections,  and other upfront  government financing. Some of these 
 Of these only about $500 billion were outside the 
North Atlantic advanced economies. 
                                                 
1 IMF (2010b). 
2 IMF (2008). 
3 IMF (2009a). 
4 IMF (2010b). 
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expenditures will, of course, be recovered.
6
Along with the coordinated fiscal and monetary policy actions, a comprehensive 
reexamination of the financial regulatory and supervisory framework is also underway 
around the world. Consequent to all the rapid and exceptional policy actions taken around 
the world, some degree of normalcy has returned to global financial markets in 2009–10. 
Given  the very heavy,  worldwide  costs  of the  recent financial crisis, it is essential that 
governments and regulatory authorities do not succumb to the natural temptations of 
complacency that such a return to normalcy could entail. 
 So the cost of this crisis has been massive for 
the global economy, and its fiscal effects will be felt for some time to come. Just as the 
global nature of the crisis has been unprecedented, so has been the global nature of the 
response, as exemplified by the G20’s commitment to coordinated action. 
Against this backdrop, this paper attempts to analyze the emerging contours of regulation of 
financial institutions, with an emphasis on the emerging challenges and dynamics. Chapter 2 
provides a broad overview of the global developments that contributed to the current global 
financial crisis. Chapter 3 presents the ongoing discussion and debate at the international 
level regarding the shortcomings of the extant regulatory framework.  This is followed by an 
analysis of proposals for reforming the regulatory framework in Chapter 4, and the paper 
concludes with a discussion of the potential difficulties in implementing the regulatory 
proposals. 
2.  EVOLUTION OF THE CRISIS: WHAT WENT WRONG? 
What are some of the identifiable sources of market failures that led to the current financial 
turbulence? The recent  financial crisis is attributed to a variety of factors,  such as 
developments in the subprime mortgage sector, excessive leverage, lax financial regulation 
and supervision, and global macroeconomic imbalances.
7
2.1  Accommodative Monetary Policy 
 At a fundamental level, however, 
the crisis also reflects the effects of a long period of excessively loose monetary policy in the 
major advanced economies during the early part of this past decade. 
After the dotcom bubble burst in the US around the turn of the decade, in a strong policy 
response, monetary policy was eased relatively aggressively in the US and then in other 
advanced economies. In the United Kingdom, whereas long-term real interest rates (yield on 
twenty-year treasury bonds) averaged about 3.5% between around 1985 and 1997, they 
then declined to about 1% by 2007.
8 Policy rates in the US reached 1% in 2002 and were 
held around this  level for an extended period, longer than was probably necessary.
9  
Excessively loose monetary policy led to excess liquidity and consequent low interest rates 
worldwide;  furthermore,  the burst of financial innovation during this period amplified and 
accelerated the consequences of excess liquidity and rapid credit expansion.
10
                                                 
6 IMF (2009d, 2010a). 
 At one time, 
investors in fixed income instruments, such as pension funds and other risk-averse 
institutions and individuals, could expect adequate risk-free real returns of around 3%, even 
7 Scott, Schultz, and Taylor (2010). 
8 Financial Services Authority (FSA 2009b). 
9. Taylor (2009); Yellen (2009). 
10 De Larosière Group (2009). ADBI Working Paper 271    Mohan 
 
3 
in the long term. However, with long-term interest rates declining to 1% and short-term rates 
even lower, investors were now reduced to seeking higher yields through investment in 
riskier instruments in both equity and debt, and in increasingly complex derivatives. 
What is interesting about this episode is that despite the persistent accommodative 
monetary policy and the accompanying strong worldwide macroeconomic growth, it did not 
result in measured inflationary pressures in goods and most services.
11
With significant increases in both investment and consumption, along with declining savings, 
aggregate demand exceeded domestic output in the US for an extended period, leading to 
persistent and increasing current account deficits as the domestic savings investment 
imbalance grew.
 Consequently, 
central banks in advanced economies, particularly in the US, did not withdraw monetary 
accommodation for an extended period. The excess liquidity worldwide did show up in rising 
asset prices and later in commodity prices, particularly oil. It was only then that measured 
inflation did start rising and central banks began to tighten monetary policy, though belatedly. 
12
Large current account surpluses in PRC and other emerging market economies (EMEs) and 
equivalent deficits in the US and elsewhere are often attributed to the exchange rate policies 
in PRC, other EMEs, and oil exporters. Given the fact that US demand exceeded output, it is 
apparent that with unchanged domestic macroeconomic policies, the US current account 
deficit would have continued at its elevated levels. In the event of a more flexible exchange 
rate policy in PRC, the sources of imports for the US would have been some countries other 
than  PRC. Although the lack of exchange rate flexibility among the Asian EMEs and oil 
exporters did contribute to the emergence of global imbalances, it can not fully explain the 
large and growing current account deficits in the US, particularly since Europe as a whole 
did not exhibit current account deficits at the same time. 
 This large excess demand of the US was supplied by the rest of the 
world, especially People’s Republic of China (PRC), which provided goods and services at 
relatively low cost, leading to corresponding current account surpluses in PRC and 
elsewhere. The surpluses generated by the oil-exporting countries added to the emerging 
global imbalances. 
2.2  Search for Yields 
As noted, accommodative monetary policy and the corresponding existence of low interest 
rates for an extended period encouraged the active search for higher yields by a host of 
market participants. The significant fall in real interest rates on low-risk instruments induced 
many institutional investors to look for ways and means to achieve uplift in their returns, both 
in their home economies and also through cross-border investments. Thus, as a 
manifestation of the search for higher returns, capital not only flowed toward financial 
innovation but also surged into EMEs; however, such flows could not be absorbed by these 
economies in the presence of either large current account surpluses or only small deficits, 
and thus largely ended up as official reserves.  These reserves were recycled into US 
government securities and those of the government-sponsored mortgage entities such as 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Thus, while accommodative monetary policy kept short-term 
interest rates low, the recycled reserves contributed to the lowering of long-term interest 
rates in the advanced economies, particularly in the US.
13
                                                 
11 Borio (2009). 
 Such low long-term interest rates 
contributed to the growth in demand for housing mortgage finance and consequent rise in 
housing prices. 
12 The U.S. personal saving rate hovered only slightly above zero from mid-2005 to mid-2007 (Yellen 2009). 
13 Borio (2009). ADBI Working Paper 271    Mohan 
 
4 
Furthermore, the stable macroeconomic environment, relatively stable growth,  and low 
inflation in the run-up to the crisis led to sustained underpricing of risks and hence excessive 
risk taking and financial innovation in the major advanced economies. It may be ironic that 
the perceived success of central banks and increased credibility of monetary policy, which 
led to enhanced expectations with regard to stability in both inflation and interest rates, could 
have led to the mispricing of risk and hence enhanced risk taking. Easy monetary policy 
itself may have generated a search for yields that resulted in a dilution of standards in 
assessing credit risk,  leading to erosion of sound practices.
14
The sustained rise in asset prices, particularly house prices, on the back of excessively 
accommodative monetary policy, and lax lending standards coupled with financial 
innovations resulted in the high growth in mortgage credit to households, particularly to low-
credit-quality households.  Due to the “originate and distribute”  model, most of these 
mortgages were securitized. In combination with strong growth in complex credit derivatives 
and with the use of credit ratings, the mortgages, inherently subprime, were bundled into a 
variety of tranches, including AAA tranches, and sold to a range of financial investors looking 
for higher yields. 
 Lower yields encouraged 
excessive leverage as banks and financial institutions attempted to maintain their 
profitability. Lacunae in financial regulation and supervision allowed this excessive leverage 
in the financial system. Assets were either shifted to off-balance-sheet vehicles that were 
effectively unregulated, or financial innovation synthetically reduced the perceived risks on 
balance sheets. 
As inflation started creeping up beginning in 2004, the US  Federal Reserve did start to 
withdraw monetary accommodation. Consequently, mortgage payments started rising with 
the increasing interest rates, while housing prices started to ease. Low-to-negligible margin 
financing and low initial teaser rates  incentivized default by the subprime  borrowers. 
Although the loans were supposedly securitized and sold to the off-balance-sheet structured 
investment vehicles, the losses were ultimately borne by the banks and financial institutions, 
wiping out a significant fraction of their capital. The uncertainty about the extent of the likely 
bank losses led to a breakdown of trust among banks. Given growing financial globalization, 
banks and financial institutions in other major advanced economies, especially Europe, were 
also adversely affected by losses and capital write-offs. Interbank money markets nearly 
froze, and this was reflected in very high spreads in money markets and debt markets. There 
was an aggressive search for safety, which resulted in very low yields on Treasury bills and 
bonds. These developments were significantly accentuated following the failure of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008, which led to a complete lack of confidence in global financial 
markets. 
The deep and lingering crisis in global financial markets, the extreme level of risk aversion, 
the mounting losses of banks and financial institutions, the elevated level of commodity and 
oil prices (until the third quarter of 2008), and the sharp correction in a range of asset prices, 
all combined, suddenly led to the sharp slowdown in growth momentum in the major 
advanced economies, especially since the Lehman failure. Global growth for 2009, which 
was projected at a healthy 3.8%  in April 2008, is now estimated by the IMF to have 
contracted by 0.8%. 
Thus the causes for the global crisis reflect the interaction of monetary policy, the choice of 
exchange rate regime in a number of countries, and important changes within the financial 
system itself, along with lax regulation arising from the belief in efficient markets and light-
touch regulation.
15
                                                 
14 Mohan (2007); Borio (2009). 
 To recap, low interest rates, together with increasing and excessive 
optimism about the future, pushed up asset prices, from stock prices to housing prices. Low 
15 See the de Larosière Group (2009); Bank for International Settlements (2008). ADBI Working Paper 271    Mohan 
 
5 
interest rates and limited volatility prompted the search for yield down the credit quality 
curve, and underestimation of risks led to creation and purchase of riskier assets. Central 
banks, focused on measured consumer price inflation and aggregate activity, while 
neglecting asset price movements, did not perceive the full implications of the growing risks 
until it was too late.
16
3.  SHORTCOMINGS IN FINANCIAL REGULATION AND 
SUPERVISION 
 
There have been calls for fundamental rethinking on macroeconomic, monetary,  and 
financial sector policies to meet the new challenges and realities; many of these ideas entail 
a structural shift in the international financial architecture and a potentially enhanced degree 
of coordination among monetary authorities and regulators. A review of the policies relating 
to financial regulation needs to address both the acute policy dilemmas in the short run and 
a fundamental rethinking of the broader frameworks of financial and economic policies over 
the medium term.
17
There has been a  great deal of very active discussion internationally about existing 
regulatory practices and the future of financial regulation and supervision. It is also perhaps 
correct to say that there is an emerging consensus on how  financial regulation and 
supervision needs to be changed. The intensity of discussion is reflected in the plethora of 
reports that have been issued by authoritative sources: 
 
i.  Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the European Union; 
chairman: Jacques de Larosière (de Larosière Group 2009). 
ii.  The Structure of Financial Supervision: Approaches and Challenges in a Global 
Market Place; chairman: Paul Volcker (Group of Thirty 2008).  
iii.  The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation, also known as the Geneva 
Report (Brunnermeier and others 2009). 
iv.  The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis 
(Financial Services Authority of the United Kingdom [FSA] 2009b).  
v.  The report of Working Group 1 of the G20 on “Enhancing, Sound Regulation and 
Strengthening Transparency” (G20 2009). 
vi.  Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations 
General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial 
System, also known as the Stiglitz Report (UN 2009). 
vii.  The U.K. Treasury report, Reforming Financial Markets (H.M. Treasury 2009). 
viii.  The US Treasury report, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation (US 
Department of the Treasury 2009). 
ix.  The report of the Warwick Commission (2009). 
What is common among all these reports is the acknowledgment that regulation and 
supervision in the advanced economies were clearly too lax in recent times,  and that 
considerable reevaluation is needed, leading to stronger and perhaps more intrusive 
regulation and supervision in the financial sector. There is clear recognition of serious 
regulatory and supervisory failures. 
                                                 
16 IMF (2009c). 
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At the root of such rethinking is really the questioning of existing intellectual assumptions 
with respect to the functioning of markets and  the nature of financial risk. To quote the 
Turner Review:  
At the core of these assumptions has been the theory of efficient and 
rational markets. Five propositions with implications for regulatory 
approach have followed: 
(i)  Market prices are good indicators of rationally evaluated 
economic value. 
(ii)  The development of securitized credit, since based on the 
creation of new and more liquid markets, has improved both 
allocative efficiency and financial stability. 
(iii)  The risk characteristics of financial markets can be inferred 
from mathematical analysis, delivering robust quantitative 
measures of trading risk. 
(iv)  Market discipline can be used as an effective tool in 
constraining harmful risk taking. 
(v)  Financial innovation can be assumed to be beneficial since 
market competition would winnow out any innovations which 
did not deliver value added. 
Each of these assumptions is now subject to extensive challenge on 
both theoretical and empirical grounds, with potential implications for 
the appropriate design of regulation and for the role of regulatory 
authorities.
18
What were the specific developments in the financial system that arose from these broadly 
accepted intellectual assumptions that led to the ongoing global financial crisis? 
 
3.1  Recurring Financial Crises: Buildup of Excessive Leverage 
Financial and banking crises have a long history, which is as old as the existence of the 
financial sector itself.
19
                                                 
18 FSA (2009b, p. 30). 
 All liquid markets can be susceptible to swings in sentiment that can 
produce significant divergence from rational equilibrium prices. However, boom and bust in 
equity prices have surprisingly small consequences relative to boom and bust in credit 
instruments, unless investment in equity instruments is itself from heavily leveraged 
borrowed resources. What is common among almost all crises is the buildup of excessive 
leverage in the system and the inevitable bursting of the financial bubble that results from 
such leverage. What is interesting about the current crisis is that this excess leverage 
occurred over a period when, through the Basel process, greater consensus had developed 
on the need for and level of adequate capital required in banking institutions across all major 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, it was assumed that sophisticated financial risk management 
capabilities also had been developed within large financial institutions during this period of 
unusually rapid growth in both the magnitude and sophistication of the financial system. This 
had some perverse results. First, because of the perceived increase in sophistication in the 
measurement of risk, high-quality risk capital in large banks could be as low as 2% of assets, 
even while complying with the Basel capital adequacy requirements. Second, large financial 
institutions could maintain lower high-quality capital because of the assumption that they had 
better risk management capacity than smaller, less sophisticated institutions. 
19 Kindleberger and Aliber (2005); Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). ADBI Working Paper 271    Mohan 
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With financial deregulation in key jurisdictions like the US and the United Kingdom, as well 
as in  most other countries, financial institutions also grew in complexity. Financial 
conglomerates began to include all financial functions under one roof: banking, insurance, 
asset management, proprietary trading, investment banking, brokerage, and the like. The 
consequence has been inadequate appreciation and assessment of the emerging risks, both 
within institutions and systemwide. What were the factors that led to this emergence of 
excessive systemwide and institutional risk? 
3.2  Growth in Securitized Credit and Derivatives 
Among the notable developments of the last decade has been the unprecedented explosive 
growth of securitized credit intermediation and associated derivatives.
20 “The wreckage on 
Wall Street stems in part from the explosive growth in complex and mispriced securitized 
mortgages, which the banks both issued and themselves held.”
21 For example, the issuance 
of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) tripled between the first quarters of 2005 and 2007, 
reaching a peak of $179 billion in the second quarter of 2007, before collapsing to $5 billion 
by the fourth quarter of 2008. The issuance of residential  mortgage-backed  securities 
doubled from $1.3 trillion to $2.7 trillion between 2001 and 2003. The assumption underlying 
this development was that it constituted a mechanism that took risk off the balance sheets of 
banks, placing it with a diversified set of investors and thereby serving to reduce banking 
system risks. The opposite actually transpired. As late as April 2006, the IMF’s Global 
Financial Stability Report noted that this dispersion would help “mitigate and absorb shocks 
to the financial system” with the result that “improved resilience may be seen in fewer bank 
failures and more consistent credit provision.”
22
This assumption has already proven erroneous, although simple forms of securitization have 
existed for a long time. Among the key functions of banks is maturity transformation: they 
intermediate shorter-term liabilities to fund longer-term assets in the nonfinancial sector. 
Banks are typically highly leveraged, and hence trust and confidence are crucial to their 
functioning and stability. Traditionally, therefore, banks exercised sharp vigilance over the 
risk elements of their assets, which were typically illiquid, to ensure constant rollover of their 
shorter-term funding liabilities. What securitization does is to turn illiquid assets into liquid 
ones, which in theory then disperse risks from the banks’ balance sheets and also reduce 
their required banking capital. With assets themselves seen as liquid short-term instruments, 
they began to be funded by ultra-short-term liabilities, including even overnight repos whose 
volume increased manyfold in recent years. The majority of holdings of securitized credit, 
however, actually ended up on the books of highly leveraged banks and bank-like 
institutions, and hence risk was concentrated rather than being dispersed. Systemic risk 
increased because traded instruments are inherently more susceptible to price swings in 
response to changes in market sentiment. What emerged was a “complex chain of multiple 
relationships between multiple institutions” and hence a higher risk of contagion within the 
financial sector.
 
23
                                                 
20 Yellen (2009). 
 Furthermore, liquidity risks in  such markets were not understood 
adequately.  It was assumed that these liquid markets would always exist, and hence 
securitized assets were assumed to be inherently less risky than illiquid long-term credit 
assets. 
21 Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (CCMR, 2009, p. 19). 
22 As quoted in the Turner Review (FSA 2009b, p. 42). 
23 FSA (2009b). ADBI Working Paper 271    Mohan 
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Financial innovation arising from the search for yields compounded this problem as second-
order derivatives proliferated and as  their valuation increasingly depended  upon model 
valuation and credit ratings rather than on  observable and transparent market valuation; 
hence  such derivatives inherently  became more opaque. Thus, when problems arose in 
these markets and prices were not visible, valuation of the assets of banks and the shadow 
banking system became unobservable.  Consequently, trust and confidence evaporated and 
markets froze. 
Compounding these problems was the emergence of the shadow banking system that took 
assets off of banks’ balance sheets, thereby reducing the latter’s capital requirements.  The 
complexity and magnitude of intrafinancial sector transactions exploded over this past 
decade. For example, issuance of global credit derivatives increased from near zero in 2001 
to over $60 trillion in 2007; foreign exchange (forex) trading activity rose tenfold from about 
$100 billion to $1,000 billion in the twenty years between 1987 and 2007, and doubled again 
after 2002; over-the-counter (OTC) interest rate derivatives grew from around zero in 1987 
to about $50 trillion in 1997 and $400 trillion by 2007; global issuance of asset-backed 
securities went up from about $500 billion in 1997 to over $2 trillion in 2007; and trading in oil 
futures increased from an equivalent of about 300 million barrels in 2005 to 1,000 million 
barrels in 2007, more than ten times the volume of oil produced!
24
Given the explosive increase in financial transactions unrelated to developments in the real 
economy, the financial sector exhibited high profits and growth while doing relatively little for 
the nonfinancial sectors of the economy, which the financial sector exists to serve in 
principle. The debt of financial companies increased to levels exceeding the GDP of leading 
economies: in the United Kingdom, for example, financial sector debt increased from 40% of 
GDP in 1987 to 200% in 2007, and in the US, from a similar 40% in 1987 to over 100% in 
2007.
 Thus the financial sector 
was increasingly separated from the real economy. 
25
The regulatory system was clearly behind the curve in taking account of these 
developments.  The procedures for calculating risk-based capital requirements 
underestimated the risks inherent in traded securitized instruments, thereby adding to the 
incentive for banks to securitize assets into traded instruments, which bore lower risk 
weights. The trading of these instruments has largely been in OTC markets that exhibit little 
transparency. As a result of this overall process, banks became effectively undercapitalized, 
and the leverage ratios of the unregulated shadow banking system and investment banks 
reached unsustainable levels. A good deal of the ongoing discussion on change in regulation 
is focused on this issue through mandating increased capital requirements for such 
activities. 
  Thus, in the process of taking risks off balance sheets through securitization, these 
risks returned to the extended banking system itself, belying  the original rationale for 
securitization.  Rather than reducing systemic risk,  the  development  of complex 
securitization and associated derivatives only served to increase it.  Moreover, it became 
increasingly difficult to trace where the risk ultimately lay. 
With the existence of low interest rates, mispriced low-risk perceptions, and inherent 
incentives to originate lending and distribute securitized instruments, household 
indebtedness increased to unprecedented levels, particularly for housing. In both the US and 
the United Kingdom, the household debt-to-GDP ratio increased from an average of around 
60% between the mid-1980s and 1990s to over 100% in the following decade.
26
                                                 
24 Turner (2010). 
 Demand for 
housing assets rose and housing prices escalated accordingly.  Thus microlevel behavior led 
25 FSA (2009a). 
26 FSA (2009b). ADBI Working Paper 271    Mohan 
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to increased systemic risk that was not adequately appreciated or understood, and hence 
was not monitored by the authorities. 
Thus there are immense emerging challenges that confront financial sector regulators as a 
consequence of the ongoing North Atlantic financial crisis. We can look forward to There will 
be  extensive debate at both the academic level and among practitioners. How will 
economists and policymakers change their views on the efficiency and rationality of markets, 
particularly financial markets? What will be the effect of such reexamination on financial 
innovation in the future? What will regulatory authorities do in the meantime while these 
debates are being settled at the intellectual level? Will they overreact and restrict financial 
growth in the months and years to come? Will this affect global GDP growth as well? 
At this point I turn to the key proposals currently being made for a major overhaul of the 
financial regulatory architecture. 
4.  REFORMING THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: THE 
FUTURE PERSPECTIVE 
There has been and is a great deal of discussion at both the national and international levels 
on reforming the financial regulatory system to address the various weaknesses that have 
emerged. At the national level, for example, both the US and U.K. treasuries have released 
detailed proposals for regulatory reform that are now being considered by their respective 
legislatures.
27 At the international level, it is the G20 that took the lead in late 2008.
28 The 
resulting  recommendations of the G20  Working Group  1  were broadly accepted by the 
leaders and remitted for implementation to the various standard-setting bodies, with the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) assigned  a broad coordination role.  The key objective 
outlined by the FSB for regulatory reform is to create a “more disciplined and less procyclical 
financial system that better supports balanced sustainable economic growth.”
29
There is no question,  therefore,  that financial regulation has to be strengthened 
comprehensively. The prevailing intellectual paradigm of light-touch regulation premised on 
the efficient markets hypothesis is being questioned. Hitherto unregulated institutions, 
markets, and instruments now will have to be brought under the regulatory framework, and 
the framework itself will need to be redesigned to address the emerging needs at both the 
national and international levels.  As this new enthusiasm for financial regulation unfolds, it is 
important that to keep in mind the basic functions of the financial system, and how they can 
be strengthened so that the needs of the real economy are better served. To reiterate: 
among the key objectives of regulatory reform is to emerge with a “more disciplined and less 
procyclical financial system that better supports balanced sustainable economic growth.” 
Such a system would not, for example, allow leverage to increase to the extent that it did.
 
30
4.1  Financial Innovation 
 
Reform should ensure that the financial system continues to play a vital role in 
intermediating savings to provide adequate levels of funding to the real sector, thereby 
supporting economic growth. It needs to be recognized that financial markets will remain 
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global and interconnected, while financial innovation will  remain  important  for  fostering 
economic efficiency. Hence, while  financial regulation and supervision  must be 
strengthened, this process must take care  not to stifle entrepreneurship and financial 
innovation.  Still,  the following question must  be constantly asked: “Financial innovation 
toward what objective?” 
As long as financial innovation is seen to promote price discovery, greater intermediation 
efficiency, better risk management, and hence overall efficiency and growth, it must be 
encouraged, but with appropriate safeguards to  maintain financial stability. Unproductive 
financial innovation, however, will need to be discouraged. Therefore, the debate on financial 
innovation and regulation has to be framed in terms of the potential and systematic 
relevance of such innovations in addition to the means for bringing them effectively under 
the regulatory umbrella.
31
In general, therefore, there is a need for reform of the regulatory framework to shield the 
financial system from potential crises while identifying measures to mitigate the 
consequences of any future episodes of financial stress. 
 The notional amounts of global derivatives relative to the nominal 
value of GDP exploded during the decade preceding the financial crisis. What was the 
economic contribution of such growth in the global economic and financial system? It clearly 
did not make the global financial system any safer at the macrolevel. Did market participants 
gain through better risk management in both the real and financial sectors? Addressing such 
questions will require intensive research on the utility of the kinds of financial innovation that 
have occurred over the past couple of decades. What has been beneficial and what has not? 
As work proceeds to bring new financial products and different kinds of derivatives under 
closer financial regulation and supervision, it should be guided by the answers to such basic 
questions. 
4.2  Perimeter of Financial Regulation 
The regulatory framework will need to keep pace with the associated risks in a more rapid 
and effective manner. Large, complex financial institutions will continue to operate in multiple 
jurisdictions in order to meet the needs of their large global clients, and supervision will need 
to be better coordinated internationally with a robust global resolution framework. To avoid 
regulatory arbitrage, there is a need for greater consistency in the regulation of similar 
instruments and of institutions performing similar activities, both within and across borders. 
As overall financial regulation is strengthened,  it will be essential  that it apply to all 
systemically important financial institutions.  For example, if only banks are subject to tighter 
regulation, that will inevitably lead to regulatory arbitrage, with much financial sector activity 
shifting to other, more lightly regulated financial institutions. That is why the G20 Working 
Group stressed the need to regulate  all  systemically  important  financial institutions. The 
questions again are how much regulation, what constitutes “systemically important,” how to 
ensure that all applicable entities, markets, and instruments are regulated, and what form 
should the regulation take? 
There is a great degree of continuing discussion on the regulation of large, complex financial 
institutions. Undoubtedly they will continue to have a global presence. How will they be 
better regulated across borders? How can better global resolution regimes be designed that 
will work in practice? 
In addition, capital markets will require greater emphasis on reducing counterparty risk and 
on ensuring that their infrastructure allows them to remain a source of funding during periods 
of stress. The postcrisis period is likely to be characterized by a financial system that 
functions with lower levels of leverage, reduced funding mismatches (both in terms of 
maturity and currency), less exposure to counterparty risk, and greater transparency 
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regarding financial instruments. After credit markets recover from the crisis, it will be 
important to mitigate the inevitable pressure to expand profits through increased risk taking. 
A more developed macroprudential approach will be important in this context. 
The type, size, and cross-border exposures of institutions and markets that will emerge from 
this crisis are likely to be considerably different than before. As banks and financial 
institutions consolidate, policymakers will have to adapt prudential regulation to firms of 
varying degrees of size and concentration. There is now general agreement, for example, 
that institutions above some size threshold should be subject to higher capital requirements, 
possibly on an escalating basis.
32
It will be necessary to consider the appropriate timing for changes in the regulatory 
framework going forward. Recommendations should promote proportionate regulatory 
reaction when needed, acknowledging the possible limits of the self-regulatory approach in 
some contexts. For example, while ultimately capital buffers for the system should be 
enhanced during periods of economic expansion, in order to be drawn down as needed in 
downturns, changes in the current environment may have negative impact on the real 
economy.  A considered and comprehensive review of the consequences of reforms and 
harmonization, coordinated across jurisdictions, is necessary to increase the effective 
transition to a more stable financial system.
 Similarly, the design of any new or revised policy will need 
to ensure healthy competition. Were the high returns that the financial sector exhibited in the 
decade preceding the crisis due to inadequate competition, or to excessive expansion in the 
trading of financial instruments, or both? Financial institutions, markets, and instruments will 
continue to evolve in ways that pose challenges for regulation, notwithstanding the 
retrenchment that is currently underway. Financial institutions, policymakers, supervisors, 
and regulators will all need to become better equipped to manage the interconnectedness of 
markets, both domestically and globally, as well as the effects of innovation and the potential 
for incentives to become misaligned. 
33
In short, the overarching mandate of reforms is to make regulatory regimes more effective 
over the cycle. This is related to many other issues,  including certain aspects of 
compensation schemes at financial institutions,
 
 margin requirements and risk management 
practices focused on value-at-risk calculations based on short historical samples
Against this broad background, this section endeavors to focus on defining the priorities for 
action in so far as financial regulation and supervision are concerned. 
, the capital 
adequacy framework, and valuation and loan loss provisioning practices.  In addition, there 
is a need to redefine the scope of the regulatory framework to establish appropriate 
oversight for the institutions and markets that may be the source of systemic risk.  Risk 
management also must  be  improved  to better evaluate vulnerabilities arising from low-
frequency, systemwide risks and to better mitigate these risks. 
4.2.1  Macroprudential Orientation 
As observed, the buildup of microinstitutional risks resulted in the unfolding of massive 
macro risk, partly through the rise in unsustainable asset prices. Therefore, as a supplement 
to sound microprudential and market integrity regulation, national financial regulatory 
frameworks should be reinforced with a macroprudential oversight that promotes a 
systemwide approach to financial regulation and supervision and mitigates the buildup of 
observable excess risks across the system. For example, there is now increasing agreement 
that when credit growth exceeds certain thresholds, it should entail additional capital buffer 
                                                 
32 FSB (2009); BCBS (2009b); CCMR (2009); Warwick Commission (2009). 
33 G20 Working Group 1 (2009). ADBI Working Paper 271    Mohan 
 
12 
requirements.
34
A number of policymaking institutions, particularly central banks, have enhanced their 
analysis of systemic risk in recent years. In fact, many of the systemic vulnerabilities that 
caused or exacerbated the current turmoil had already been identified, but mechanisms to 
effectively translate these analyses into policy action have been lacking. The basic idea here 
is to multiply the capital adequacy ratios with a systemic risk factor. This means that better 
measures of macroprudential risk must be found. It is argued that leverage ratios, maturity 
mismatches, and estimates of bank credit expansion should be taken into account. Thus 
highly leveraged and fast growing “systemic” institutions would be subject to higher capital 
requirements than the rest. The idea is that when there is growing  systemic risk, 
characterized by  increasing leverage, maturity mismatches, credit expansion,  and asset 
price increases during boom times, the required amount of banking capital should increase, 
and conversely decrease during downturns when deleveraging takes place (Brunnermeier 
and others 2009).  These ideas are now gaining wider acceptance, and the standard setters 
are busy finding ways and means to translate them into practice. 
 Such thresholds will have to vary across jurisdictions, and the challenge will 
remain how to identify such thresholds. Prudential regimes should encourage behavior that 
supports systemic stability,  discourages regulatory arbitrage,  and adopts the concept of 
“systemic” risk, factoring in the effects of leverage and funding.  In most jurisdictions, this will 
require improved coordination mechanisms between various financial authorities, mandates 
for all financial authorities account for financial system stability, and effective tools to 
address systemic risks. It will also require an effective global roundtable—currently proposed 
to be the Financial Stability Board—to bring together national financial authorities to jointly 
assess systemic risks across the global financial system and to coordinate policy responses. 
Potential macroprudential tools to be explored further could include: 
i.  complementing risk-based capital measures with simpler indicators 
aimed to measure the buildup of leverage, with enhanced sensitivity to 
off-balance-sheet exposures; 
ii.  capital requirements that adjust over the financial cycle; 
iii.  monitoring the sectoral growth of credit to identify areas of “excess credit 
growth” when they arise; 
iv.  loan  loss provisioning standards that incorporate all available credit 
information; 
v.  use of longer historical samples to assess risk and margin requirements; 
and 
vi.  greater focus on loan-to-value ratios for mortgages. 
In general, the challenge is to continually endeavor to strike a balance between macro- and 
microprudential regulation. 
4.2.2  Regulatory Regime 
With the emergence of the shadow banking system and other leveraged financial 
institutions, the scope of regulation and oversight needs to be expanded to include all 
systemically important institutions, markets, and instruments. Accordingly, the perimeter of 
financial sector surveillance would have to be extended,  possibly with differentiated 
thresholds  to allow institutions to graduate from simple disclosures to higher levels of 
prudential oversight as their contribution to systemic risks increases. Work is under way to 
devise practical guidelines for regulators to assess systemic importance so that regulation of 
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all systemically important institutions can be done in a consistent manner.
35
The main bone of contention here, inter alia, is whether and how to regulate private pools of 
capital, including private equity funds and hedge funds. There is no doubt that such funds 
have increased in size tremendously over the past couple of decades. The amount of money 
hedge funds manage has increased from around $40 billion in 1990 to $540 billion in 2001 
and $2 trillion in 2008, a growth rate far in excess of any metric related to the real 
economy.
 Financial 
authorities will need enhanced information on all material financial institutions and markets, 
including private pools of capital that are leveraged. Large, complex financial institutions 
require particularly robust oversight given their size and global reach. Regulatory 
disincentives should also be included to discourage such institutions from becoming too big 
to fail and to  reduce complexity in their group structures. The regulatory and oversight 
framework should strive to treat similar institutions and activities consistently, with greater 
emphasis on functions and activities and less emphasis on legal status. 
36 There are now about 10,000 hedge funds in existence. There have been 
differences in opinion regarding the role of these funds in the current global financial crisis. 
Nevertheless, there is broad agreement that private pools of capital, including hedge funds, 
can be a source of risk owing to their combined size in the market, their use of leverage and 
maturity mismatches, and their connectedness with other parts of the financial system. 
There is emerging agreement that all such funds need to be registered with a designated 
regulatory authority, but there is continuing debate on the extent of their regulation.
37
The widespread reliance of market participants on credit ratings of market instruments led to 
inadequate risk analysis. Thus credit rating agencies also will require regulatory oversight. 
Furthermore, there is a need to modify rating agency practices and procedures for managing 
conflicts of interest and for assuring the transparency and quality of the rating process, 
particularly the process for rating complex securitized instruments and derivatives. Certain 
regulatory regimes mandate the use of credit ratings for risk management and for 
assessment of capital requirements within institutions, leading to inadequate in-house 
assessment of risk by these institutions. Regulators will need to reduce or eliminate such 
mandates so that all financial institutions take greater responsibility for their own risk 
assessments. Given the global scope of some credit rating agencies, the oversight 
framework should be consistent across jurisdictions, with appropriate sharing of information 
between national authorities responsible for the oversight of credit rating agencies. There is 
also need for much greater independent research in assessing post facto how well credit 
rating agencies have fared in their credit rating practices. Since their data and 
methodologies are generally proprietary, including the confidential information they have on 
the entities and instruments being rated, such research has been difficult, if not impossible, 
to do. Regulators will need to find ways of making such research possible without violating 
the need to maintain confidentiality. 
 
4.2.3  Procyclicality 
Once conditions in the financial system have recovered, international standards for capital 
and liquidity buffers will have to be raised, and the buildup of capital buffers and provisions in 
good times should be encouraged so that capital can absorb losses and be drawn down in 
difficult times, such as the current period. It will be necessary to develop a methodology to 
link the stage in the business cycle to capital requirements in a nondiscretionary way and to 
accounting and prudential standards. Broad agreement is now emerging in the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the FSB that capital buffers have to be built 
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in to constrain procyclical buildup of leverage in financial institutions. In addition to the 
changes being proposed to raise  capital adequacy norms, minimum global liquidity 
standards are also being  explored along with greater requirements for countercyclical 
provisioning. The implementation of these new standards then  should be effective in 
constraining the procyclical buildup of leverage in financial systems on an automatic basis. 
 Many questions have also arisen about accounting conventions and procedures that are 
perceived to add to procyclicality in the financial system. It should be recognized that the 
clock should not be turned back on fair  value  accounting just to address the issue of 
temporary market illiquidity. What is needed is to make clear the nature of price uncertainty 
and to do so in a manner that symmetrically addresses the potential for mispricing in illiquid 
markets as well as in booming markets. Improvements could include better guidance and 
principles for mark-to-market valuation, information on the variance around the fair value 
calculations, and data on historic prices. 
4.2.4  Prudential Oversight 
There are three broad areas with regard to prudential oversight that require strengthening: 
capital adequacy framework, liquidity risk management,  and infrastructure for OTC 
derivatives. 
4.2.4.1  Capital Adequacy Framework 
There is a clear recognition of the need for higher quantity and quality capital; this will result 
in minimum regulatory requirements that significantly exceed existing Basel thresholds. The 
emphasis is on increasing the quantity and quality of tier 1 capital. It is being proposed that 
only common equity shares and retained earnings be counted toward tier 1 capital. As these 
tougher requirements are introduced, it is understood that the transition to future standards 
needs to be carefully phased given the importance of maintaining bank lending in the current 
macroeconomic climate. In view of the serious problems that arose from lower risk weights 
being attached to assets in the trading book, there is also agreement that the  capital 
required against trading book activities should be increased significantly. Published accounts 
could also include buffers to  anticipate potential future losses, through, for instance, the 
creation of an “economic  cycle  reserve.”  There is also increasing agreement on the 
introduction of a maximum gross leverage ratio as a backstop discipline against excessive 
growth in absolute balance sheet size.
38
4.2.4.2  Liquidity Risk Management 
 In addition, in the  context of rapid financial 
innovation and risk-based regulatory capital requirements, a well-constructed non-risk-based 
capital measure can at least partially address the problem of modeling deficiencies for the 
advanced approaches and ensure that a minimum level of capital is retained in the banking 
system. 
A new element in the future regulatory approach is explicit recognition that liquidity 
regulation and supervision must be given the same emphasis as  capital regulation.
39
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Individual institutions have demonstrated that their own internal incentive structures are such 
that liquidity risk may be procyclical due to its links with market and credit risk and to 
accelerator factors, such as the mark-to-market effects of asset values and net worth. 
Structural reliance on short-term wholesale market funding, including via securitization, has 
increased the sensitivity of banks’ balance sheets and cost of funds to procyclical elements. 
Some regulators were already giving attention to such issues. The Reserve Bank of India, 
for instance, places prudential limits on purchased overnight interbank liabilities and restricts 
39 BCBS (2009a). ADBI Working Paper 271    Mohan 
 
15 
the uncollateralized overnight market to commercial banks. It also monitors actively the ratio 
of wholesale purchased funding that banks have to their more stable deposit funding. 
Therefore, regulatory policies need to reflect appropriately the true price of funding liquidity 
on financial institutions’ balance sheets—ensuring that the market does not rely excessively 
on the central bank’s emergency liquidity support facility. Policies that could be considered 
include: 
i.  improved funding risk management by strengthening risk management 
and governance and control; 
ii.  introduction of minimum quantitative funding liquidity buffers of  high-
quality liquidity assets; 
iii.  imposition of a thirty-day liquidity coverage ratio; 
iv.  a longer-term structural liquidity ratio; 
v.  introduction of a regulatory charge for institutions that present a higher-
than-average liquidity risk, and pricing of access to central bank liquidity 
in order to encourage institutions holding better quality collateral; and 
vi.  requiring global banks to have sufficient high-quality liquid assets. 
An effective global framework for managing liquidity in large, cross-border financial 
institutions should include internationally agreed levels of liquidity buffers and should 
encourage an increase in the quality of their composition. Such a framework needs to be 
comprehensive and take into account overall liquidity needs. In the ongoing discussion 
related to enhanced requirements for mandating liquidity buffers, there is some debate on 
the choice of instruments that will qualify as high-quality liquid instruments: will they include 
only treasuries, or will high-quality corporate bonds also qualify?
40
4.2.4.3  Infrastructure for OTC Derivatives 
 Again, for example, the 
Reserve Bank of India has long imposed a 25% “statutory liquidity ratio” on all commercial 
banks: 25%  of their net demand and time liabilities have to be invested in government 
securities. The financial industry would clearly like to broaden the kinds of instruments that 
would be acceptable, but the implication of such broadening would be that central banks 
also would have to broaden the collateral that they accept for their liquidity operations. 
As documented, the explosion of credit derivatives and their offshoots (such as CDOs and 
CDOs-squared) has demonstrated the clear need for oversight and transparency in this 
market. The market for credit default swaps (CDSs) operates on a bilateral, OTC basis and 
has grown to many times the size of the market for the underlying credit instruments. In light 
of problems involving some large players in this market, attention has focused on the 
systemic risks posed by CDSs. There is a global consensus on the need for centralized 
clearing and a central counterparty (CCP) for all the OTC derivative products. Accordingly, 
efforts are on in the US, the European Union, and elsewhere to implement CCPs for CDSs. 
There is general agreement that standardized contracts should be conducted on designated 
exchanges, while the remaining OTC trades also should be cleared centrally. They would 
then be subject to the scrutiny of a central counterparty and would have mandatory reporting 
requirements on a transparent platform.
41
The development of a CCP facilitates greater market transparency, including the reporting of 
prices for CDSs, trading volumes, and aggregate open interest. The availability of pricing 
information can improve the fairness, efficiency, and competitiveness of  markets—all of 
which enhance investor  protection and facilitate capital formation. The degree of 
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transparency, of course, depends on the extent of participation in the CCP. If needed, some 
incentives may be provided by national authorities, for example, by taking a higher capital 
charge for transactions not cleared through central counterparties. If capital requirements 
are related to the counterparty risk exposures that arise from derivatives, repos, and security 
financing activities, it will incentivize  institutions to increase OTC derivative exposure to 
CCPs and exchanges while also reducing the probability of contagion when problems arise. 
To foster transparency and promote the use of a CCP and of exchange trading for credit 
derivatives, public authorities should also encourage the financial industry to standardize 
contracts and use a data repository for the remaining nonstandardized contracts, and  to 
promote fair and open access to central counterparty services. The use of a CCP will 
naturally lead to higher costs in OTC trading, which would itself lend some stability to the 
system. 
A  CCP mechanism already exists for clearing and settling all interbank spot forex 
transactions and all outright and repo transactions in government securities. Nonguaranteed 
settlement of OTC trades in interest rate swaps also  commenced in 2008. Guaranteed 
settlement of interest rate swap  (IRS)  and forex forwards is a work in progress at an 
advanced stage. 
India already has an institution (the Clearing Corporation of India) for centralized clearing 
and settlement of all interbank spot forex transactions and all outright and repo transactions 
in government securities. Nonguaranteed settlement of OTC trades in IRSs has also started. 
Work is now under way on guaranteed settlement of IRS and forex forwards.
42
 There is also some debate on the number of CCPs that are needed to foster stability in a 
system. Some argue that to mitigate systemic risk resulting from counterparty credit risk, it 
would be beneficial to have a competitive environment for central counterparties, but without 
imposing regulatory requirements that unduly fragment the market. Others argue that 
because of netting in a clearing house with a central counterparty, overall risk is reduced 
substantially, and hence only one or two clearing houses are needed in any particular 
system.
 
43
4.2.4.4  Compensation 
 It must be ensured, however, that the CCP is adequately funded. 
Among the issues that have gained prominence as contributory factors to the emergence of 
the global financial crisis is the explosion of remuneration in the financial sector, particularly 
in comparison with trends in the rest of the economy. Much more attention is now being 
given to the development of sound practice principles by the international standard setters. It 
is important that reforms in this regard be done on an industry-wide basis so that improved 
risk management and compensation practices by some systemically important firms are not 
undermined by the unsound practices of others. Among the proposals being discussed is the 
principle that there must be a link between overall firm performance and individual bonuses 
given; this is in response to the observation that large bonuses are given even if the firm 
making losses. Another principle being enunciated is that guaranteed bonuses should be 
either prohibited or, at a minimum, be subject to limitations. In any case, there is general 
agreement that bonuses should be aligned with the long-term performance of the firm rather 
than with short-term profits. 
In view of the compensation practices that have been observed even after the financial 
crisis, there is no doubt that there will be greater supervisory oversight over compensation 
practices for some time to come. At the present time, financial institutions have returned to 
profitability, to a great extent due to the extraordinary official measures taken to stabilize the 
financial system. The market mechanism does not seem to ensure that these profits are 
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retained in financial institutions to bolster their capital. The firms that benefited from Troubled 
Asset Relief Program funds have preferred to return the funds as soon as they could rather 
than submit to regulatory limitations on compensation that they would have been subject to 
otherwise. Some feel that restricting dividend payments, share buybacks, and compensation 
rates  is an  appropriate  way  to constrain the kind of excessive compensation practices 
observed.
44
 Along with the enunciation of such principles and practices, it is important to look carefully at 
the inherent market incentive structure that has led to the observed compensation practices 
in the financial sector. Acting on this flawed incentive structure is more likely to be effective 
than regulatory prescriptions. 
 
There is a need to question further the focus on compensation in the financial sector: is the 
compensation issue actually a red herring? Is it not the explosion in intrafinancial sector 
transactions and excess profitability of financial institutions that has led to the very high 
compensation levels of their employees along with the high returns to shareholders? If a firm 
has such high returns, they have to go somewhere: they are either distributed to 
shareholders or to the employees or a combination of both, which is what has been 
happening. In this case, it is then difficult to restrict compensation levels as is being argued 
currently. If the distribution of profits goes disproportionately to management and employees, 
then the question relates to corporate governance practices. Why do boards not act more in 
the interest of shareholders? Much of the discussion has veered off into the minutiae of 
compensation practices related to the various forms in which compensation is given. To my 
mind, the real question relates to the high profitability observed in recent years in segments 
of the financial sector. 
Therefore, the question really is, is there a lack of competition in the financial sector? And if 
so why? Are there some regulatory provisions that restrain competition, or are there some 
entry barriers inherent in the structure of the financial industry? If competition is not lacking, 
then why are these profits not competed downward? And again, if the answer is indeed that 
there is a lack of competition, what can be done? What kind of competition policy measures 
would be relevant and applicable to the financial sector? Addressing these questions is 
probably more useful for addressing  the compensation issue than focusing narrowly on 
compensation patterns and levels. 
4.2.4.5  Risk Management 
The fundamental weaknesses in risk management practices revealed in the current crisis 
were the inability of financial institutions to adequately monitor risk concentrations across 
products and geographic areas, shortcomings in stress testing, and inappropriate practices 
for managing risks arising from structured products. First and foremost, it remains the 
responsibility of the private sector to take the lead in strengthening firmwide risk 
management frameworks.  Both management and the board of directors are responsible for 
instituting adequate risk management and control systems. Generally, banks are expected to 
have in place effective internal policies, systems, and controls to identify, measure, monitor, 
manage, control, and mitigate their risk concentrations in a timely manner and under various 
conditions, including stressed market situations. The supervisory authorities would have to 
oversee compliance of such best practices for capturing firmwide risk concentrations arising 
from both on- and off-balance-sheet exposures and securitization activities.  For example, 
with respect to OTC derivative markets, it is being proposed that capital requirements be 
strengthened to reflect the actual risk  of  OTC derivatives. In deriving such capital 
requirements,  it is also being proposed that new standards be devised to account for 
counterparty risks. When trading is done on an exchange or with a central counterparty, the 
                                                 
44 FSB (2009). ADBI Working Paper 271    Mohan 
 
18 
capital requirement would naturally be lower, thereby incentivizing firms to minimize bilateral 
OTC trading. 
4.2.4.6  Transparency 
Given the serious problems that have arisen, there clearly needs to be greater emphasis on 
increasing the transparency of the techniques, data characteristics, and caveats involved in 
the valuation of complex financial instruments; improved information regarding OTC 
derivatives markets and clearing arrangements; and better reporting of exposures in a 
format that permits regulators to aggregate and assess risks to the system as a whole. This 
would help investors perform some of the due diligence currently outsourced to credit rating 
agencies while also helping the latter to do better in measuring the tail risks. 
The fundamental issue here is twofold: standard setters should work with supervisors and 
regulators, first, to reduce complexity in accounting standards to facilitate better assessment 
of uncertainty surrounding valuation, and second, to achieve consistency of valuation 
methods and a single set of accounting standards. 
4.2.4.7  Enforcement 
International standards (including those for macroprudential regulation), scope of regulation, 
capital adequacy, and liquidity buffers should be coordinated to ensure a common and 
coherent international framework  that  national financial authorities should apply in their 
countries, consistent with national circumstances. The expanded Financial Stability Forum—
now renamed the Financial Stability Board—the International Monetary Fund, and the 
international standard setters could assume this coordination role. In addition, the financial 
regulatory and oversight frameworks and their implementation in all G20 countries should be 
reviewed periodically, validated internationally, and made public. 
5.  THE CHALLENGES AHEAD 
The agenda that is being developed for strengthening financial sector regulation  and 
supervision is ambitious. Contentious issues are arising both at domestic regulatory levels 
and at the international level regarding regulatory cooperation. Whereas the principles that 
have been outlined for this regulatory overhaul are increasingly well accepted, many 
challenges will arise regarding their modes of implementation and their practicality. 
5.1  Regulatory Structure and Authority 
First, there is much discussion in many jurisdictions on the changes needed in regulatory 
structure to minimize the probability of such a financial crisis arising again. There is general 
agreement on the need to establish a regime of macroprudential regulation and financial 
stability oversight, and these regimes will need to be more effective over the economic cycle.  
The issue under discussion in different jurisdictions is, who will do it? Would it be a council of 
regulators, the central bank,  or the treasury? The core concern behind such discussion 
relates to the location of responsibility for maintaining financial stability. Should central banks 
be made responsible, and also accountable, for maintaining financial stability? 
Macroprudential regulation is increasingly seen as one of the key means for maintaining 
financial stability. It  entails the imposition of prudential regulations whenever  some 
macroeconomic  or overall financial trends require action. If the central bank is only a 
monetary authority,  and a separate agency, like the Financial Services Authority of the 
United Kingdom, is responsible for financial regulation and supervision, how is coordination 
to be achieved so that such action can be implemented? The US has a very fragmented 
regulatory structure, whereas the United Kingdom has placed all regulatory responsibilities 
for all segments of the financial sector with  the unified FSA. The US  Federal Reserve ADBI Working Paper 271    Mohan 
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System does have significant regulatory responsibilities,  but regulatory failures were 
significant in all North Atlantic financial systems, with the exception of Canada. So it is 
difficult to cite any existing system as comprising best practice. 
The US Treasury has proposed the following: 
i.  formation of a Financial Sector Oversight Council, to be headed by the 
treasury secretary, to coordinate all the regulators, and the chairman of 
the US Federal Reserve would be one among all the other regulators in 
such a council; 
ii.  unification of all banking regulation in a single agency; 
iii.  creation of a new agency for consumer protection in the financial sector; 
and 
iv.  assigning greater responsibility to  the  US  Federal Reserve for 
maintaining financial stability.
45
In the United Kingdom, the FSA has been made responsible for macroprudential regulation 
while the Bank of England retains the responsibility for financial stability. Meanwhile, the 
opposition Conservative Party has announced that it will merge the FSA with the Bank 
England should it come to power in the next elections. All such proposals will have to 
undergo legislative approval in their respective jurisdictions. As of now, there is no emerging 
consensus with respect to the best regulatory structure for maintaining financial stability. 
 
I have perhaps a biased view, having been in a central bank, though I have also worked in 
the treasury.  I really do not believe that effective macroprudential oversight or financial 
stability oversight can be done without the central bank being at the helm of this activity.  
Any kind of group can be set up, depending on the country’s overall regulatory framework, 
and can include the treasury and the heads of the other regulatory entities. The central bank 
is the lender of last resort; it is also the only agency that has an overall view of the economy, 
along with exceptional stability in terms of staffing and continuity in thinking, relative to most 
treasuries. It should have its ear to the ground with respect to evolving developments in all 
financial markets if it is doing its job well as a monetary authority. 
Since the Reserve Bank of India is the monetary authority and also the financial sector 
regulator, it has been able to supplement its monetary policy very effectively with prudential 
actions on a consistent basis. It regularly monitors credit aggregates, including movements 
in sectoral credit. Consequently, it took action when it observed excess credit growth, both 
on an aggregate basis and in particular sectors like real estate and housing. So it increased 
the cash reserve ratio  to curb overall credit growth and imposed higher risk weights for 
lending in the affected sectors. As part of its supervisory activities,  it also monitors the 
incremental credit deposit ratio carefully and cautions banks when such a ratio is found to 
exceed acceptable norms. It is also able to do forward-looking countercyclical capital 
buffering through increases in loan loss provisioning when needed. In addition, when it 
observed regulatory arbitrage being practiced by the lightly regulated nonbank finance 
companies during 2005–07, it took measures to tighten their regulation so as to reduce their 
capacity to take on excess leverage. This experience is a valuable example for practicing the 
kind of proposals being put forward for implementing macroprudential polices as 
supplements to monetary policy as normally practiced in a narrow fashion. 
I do believe that given different countries with large variations in institutional legacies, 
traditions, and systems, no one size can fit all. But at the same time, I think that the central 
bank does need to have a lead role as far as financial stability is concerned within any kind 
of arrangement that is deemed fit in a particular country. As a recent IMF paper notes: “If 
one accepts the notion that, together, monetary policy and regulation provide a large set of 
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cyclical tools, this raises the issue of how coordination is achieved between the monetary 
and the regulatory authorities, or whether the central bank should be in charge of both. The 
increasing trend toward separation of the two may well have to be reversed. Central banks 
are obvious candidates as macro prudential regulators.”
46 In any case, there is a clear need 
for a comprehensive approach to regulatory risk in the financial sector, particularly as the 
perimeter of financial regulation is widened to encompass hitherto unregulated or lightly 
regulated entities such as hedge funds, credit rating agencies, and other nonbank financial 
companies.
47
5.2  Impact of Proposed Regulatory Changes 
 
The various proposals that are under discussion with respect to enhanced capital 
requirements will lead to increased levels of regulatory capital over the economic cycle, and 
extension of such capital requirements to bank-like institutions that are currently unregulated 
or lightly regulated will inevitably lead to lower profitability for equity investors. In addition to 
the increases in basic capital adequacy that are being considered, other proposals under 
discussion include: 
i.  higher quality tier  1  capital  to  consist  of only common shares and 
reserves, 
ii.  maintenance of countercyclical capital buffers, 
iii.  countercyclical provisioning, 
iv.  higher risk weights for trading instruments, and 
v.  higher capital requirements for systemically important financial 
institutions (for example, institutions with assets exceeding $250 billion). 
The bargaining power of banking institutions had become weak in the wake of the financial 
crisis;  hence there was little initial observable protest regarding such proposals. As the 
financial crisis is resolved and as some semblance of normalcy and profitability begins to 
return to the financial sector, the financial industry is likely to do its utmost to resist the 
requirements for higher capital. It will be a challenge for regulators and governments to resist 
demands for relaxation of the new capital requirements, both the enhanced minimum levels 
and the capital buffers proposed for good times. The lobbying power of the financial industry 
will be restored by that time, and therefore authorities will need to be prepared for such 
challenges.
48
Everyone seems to agree that there is need for increased levels of regulatory capital. The 
key problem that requires further analysis is that such a change implies lower profitability for 
the financial sector. That in itself may not be such a bad idea for the maintenance of financial 
stability.  But there is still need for greater understanding of its implications for the financial 
sector as a whole. Would more stringent capital requirements imply a slower pace of credit 
intermediation and overall lower economic growth? Or does it just mean that there will be 
less intrafinancial sector activity, with negligible implications for the real economy? There is 
clearly a great need to work out the overall economic effects of the current recommendations 
related to the proposed regulatory overhaul. Such impact studies are now being conducted 
by the BCBS before the new capital standards are put in place. 
 Lower systemic profitability levels will also be effective endogenously in limiting 
compensation levels in the financial sector. 
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5.3  Implementing Countercyclical Capital Requirements 
The proposal for provision of countercyclical capital will face significant implementation 
issues.  Regulators will need to do significant technical work  on understanding business 
cycles so that turning points can be recognized. What would be the triggers for changing 
these capital buffers in either direction? Would these changes commence in anticipation of 
business cycle turns or post facto?  How formal- or rule-based would these changes be so 
that regulated institutions know in advance what they need to do?  An additional issue in this 
sphere arises from the possibility of economic cycles occurring at different times in different 
jurisdictions. This would necessitate greater cross-border cooperation between home and 
host regulators in terms of applicable capital requirements for different segments of the 
same international financial conglomerate. An additional problem for EMEs would be the 
lack of adequate data for business cycle identification. 
5.4  Identifying and Addressing Systemic Risks 
There is general agreement on the need for macroprudential regulations and the 
identification of systemic risks such as the buildup of asset bubbles. However, considerable 
technical work will need to be done at both national and international levels on identifying 
what such risks are, what is systemic and what is not, and what kind of regulatory actions 
would be effective. In the recent experience, for example, there was ample awareness of the 
buildup of both global financial imbalances and the asset price bubble, but there was little 
agreement on what needed to be done. Even if adequate work is done to identify systemic 
risk and determine  the regulatory measures necessary, what will be the enforcement 
methodology internationally? Within national regulatory systems,  issues relating to 
interregulatory cooperation will also arise: who will be in charge of issuing early warnings 
and who will listen to them? 
5.5  Defining What Is Systemically Important 
 There is also  general agreement on extending  regulation  to  all systemically important 
institutions, markets, and instruments. But here again there is an implementation issue:  how 
to decide what is systemically important. Certainly, all financial institutions that have access 
to the central bank liquidity window or to whom the central bank can act as lender of last 
resort should be subject to capital regulation. Considerable debate has ranged around the 
regulation of hedge funds, which come in all sizes and forms.  Some are large but not 
leveraged, others can be both large and leveraged, and yet others can be small and 
leveraged or otherwise.  Whereas it may be that individual hedge funds or other equity pools 
are not systemically important, they may be so collectively. Furthermore, they could be 
collectively not important systemically in good times but become so in times of extensive 
leveraging.  A similar story applies to markets and instruments. Thus national and 
international regulatory systems have their work cut out for them in this regard, especially 
since excessive regulation could indeed snuff out entrepreneurship. 
5.6  Handling Securitized Credit 
A great deal of debate has emerged around the issue of securitized credit and its offshoots. 
Were financial innovations in this area largely unproductive and dysfunctional, and do they 
need to be discouraged? That the explosion in the magnitude of such derivative instruments 
did not provide any benefit to the financial system or the economy as a whole is now clear. 
However, securitization is a time-honored practice  that has done much to lubricate the 
financial system and helped fund real economy needs at competitive costs. So how these 
instruments are regulated and how the “good” financial innovations will be winnowed from 
the “bad” will be a challenge. ADBI Working Paper 271    Mohan 
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5.7  International Regulatory Cooperation Regulating Large, 
Complex Global Firms 
As the current global crisis has shown, whereas  many of the large,  complex financial 
institutions operate on a worldwide scale, their regulation is national. There is currently much 
discussion on how international regulatory cooperation can be improved, and there appears 
to be a good degree of consensus emerging in the standard-setting bodies regarding the 
contours of enhanced  regulation  for global firms.
49
There is also increasing debate on institutions being too big to fail.
 But implementation of their 
recommendations will rest with national authorities and their respective legislatures. The 
domestic debates within national jurisdictions are much more fractious than those within the 
international standard-setting bodies, and the financial industry has much greater lobbying 
power within national borders and their respective legislatures and governments than among 
the largely technocratic standard setters. Apart from the regulatory problems associated with 
ongoing institutions, even more difficult are the problems associated with cross-border 
resolution of failing institutions. The discussion on these issues has just begun. 
50 In the US, there has 
been renewed debate on whether to reinstitute some Glass-Steagall type restrictions on the 
activities that are allowed for banking institutions. Should banking be boring? Whereas there 
would appear to be little support for bringing back the full separation between commercial 
and investment banks, broker-dealers, and insurance companies, there is emerging 
consensus that banks’  activities in proprietary trading should be curbed.
51
5.8  Capital Account Management 
   Banks have 
deposit insurance protection and also have access to lender of last resort facilities from the 
central bank. In times of liquidity stress, they can receive liquidity assistance from the central 
bank, whereas in times of insolvency, it is deposit insurance that comes to their rescue. 
Thus, if banks’ risk-taking activities result in stress, their losses are effectively socialized. 
Therefore  some curb on their excessive risk-taking activities is justified. The recent 
experience has shown that in times of extreme crisis and panic, as happened in late 2008 in 
the  US, even institutions that are,  ex ante, not entitled to central bank liquidity support 
effectively receive it if they are deemed to be systemically important and hence too big to 
fail. So apart from the issue of restrictions on banks’ speculative activities, there is a general 
issue of financial institutions becoming too big on a global scale. 
From the perspective of emerging market economies,  at the macrolevel, the volatility in 
capital flows has led to severe problems in both macroeconomic management and financial 
regulation.
52
                                                 
49 BCBS (2009b); FSB (2009); G20 Working Group 1 (2009). 
 These capital flows have been influenced significantly by the extant monetary 
policy regimes in developed countries, and hence their volatility is not necessarily related to 
economic conditions in the receiving economies. Excess flows, sudden stops, and reversals 
have significant effects on EME financial sectors, the working of their capital markets, and 
asset prices, and hence on their economies as a whole. Management of this volatility 
involves action in monetary policy, fiscal management, capital account management, and 
also financial market regulation. This will remain a challenge since there is little international 
50 Scott, Schultz, and Taylor (2010). 
51 See Volcker (2010); Brady (2010); Schultz (2010). 
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discussion on this issue. There is, however, increasing recognition that some degree of 
capital controls may be desirable in such circumstances.
53
5.9  Exiting Accommodative Monetary Policy 
 
In response to the crisis, monetary policy has been loosened substantially in major 
advanced economies since the second half of 2007. Policy rates have been cut to near zero 
levels, even lower than that in 2003–04, and financial systems have been flooded with large 
liquidity. Abundant liquidity is already being reflected in return of capital flows to EMEs, and 
this excess liquidity, if not withdrawn quickly, runs the risk of inducing the same excesses 
and imbalances that were witnessed during 2003–07, including the likely recycling back of 
capital to the advanced economies. As the global economy starts recovery, a calibrated exit 
from this unprecedented accommodative monetary policy will have to be ensured to avoid 
the recurrence of the financial crisis being experienced now. 
6.  CONCLUSION 
To summarize, the emergence of the global financial crisis has led to a new wave of thinking 
on all issues related to both monetary policy and financial regulation. The practice of both 
monetary policy and financial regulation had tended to become too formula bound and 
hence predictable. While these new principles are being debated, it is important to realize 
that in the face of unexpected developments that always arise in the financial sector, there is 
an important role for the exercise of judgment by both monetary authorities and financial 
regulators. Whereas considerable progress has been achieved on the principles governing 
this regulatory overhaul, very significant challenges remain on the implementation issues 
that will arise as a new regime takes hold globally. 
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